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Who’s afraid of the big bad BRICS? Brazil is in crisis, its economy in free-fall, its president impeached, 
and its people terrorized by the zika virus. Russia is suffering under international economic sanctions 
and a 50 percent collapse in the value of the Ruble. India’s economy is growing robustly butthe 
country faces repeated political and environmental crises that never seem to go away. 
China seems to be growing, but much more slowly than in recent decades and only due to large-
scale, unsustainable government deficit spending. There are fears of a collapse of China’s financial 
sector as bad loans mount, and the government seems unable to reform. The economy of 
sometimes-BRIC South Africa is flat and the country suffers from chronic violence, power shortages, 
and labor strife. 
Keeping in mind that all five BRICS countries are relatively poor and relatively poorly governed (by 
North American or European standards), it can be hard to understand why anyone paid much heed 
the rise of the BRICS in the first place. Yet in the 2000s, a whole industry of doom developed around 
predictions of the demise of capitalism, the demise of democracy, and the demise of the West in 
general. Wise people knew that the BRICS were the future. 
Western doom-mongering hit its peak during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, which the 
BRICS countries largely escaped. They escaped because China (correctly) embarked on a massive 
fiscal stimulus program to stay out of recession, and China’s hunger for raw materials kept Brazil, 
Russia, and South Africa afloat. (India was largely insulated from the crisis by its relatively low level 
of integration with the global economy.) 
But when it came time to pay the piper in the mid-2010s, China’s private sector economic growth 
slowed (or stopped). Commodity prices collapsed, and with them the economies that China had 
been keeping afloat. Western doom-mongers moved on to fret about Syrian refugees and the 
Islamic State, and the BRICS fell off the front pages. 
These days BRICS books can read like post-mortems, but long after Assad and the Islamic State have 
faded into history, the BRICS (and books about them) will still be with us. As BRICS-boosters like to 
point out, they govern huge portions of the world’s people and territory, include two permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council, and produce most of the world’s new billionaires. 
The BRICS are here to stay. But so what? 
Hopes, not fears 
The now familiar BRICS acronym was coined in 2001 as the BRICs (minus South Africa) by investment 
analyst Jim O’Neill and consummated in the first BRICs leaders’ conference in 2008. An obvious 
orthographical addition, South Africa was officially “admitted” to the group (at China’s insistence) at 
the 2011 BRICS summit. Born an investment strategy, the BRICS grouping has grown into a global 
political force with annual summits and its own bank, the New Development Bank (NDB or “BRICS 
Bank”), which opened for business in Shanghai at the beginning of 2016. 
For Cedric de Coning, lead editor of The BRICS and Coexistence: An Alternative Vision of World 
Order, the foundation of the NDB “represents a significant milestone in the maturity of the BRICS.” 
With this new institution, the BRICS are “actually taking steps to start transforming the global order 
by introducing new institutions aimed at shaping an environment that is conducive to their 
developmental goals.” He goes so far as to claim that the BRICS “share a common vision for a new 
global order.” 
De Coning and his co-editors argue that the BRICS countries are collectively pursuing a strategy of 
“coexistence” with the West that, if successful, will see them establish an alternative basis for 
legitimacy in the interstate system. The BRICS coexistence strategy is based on four principles that 
might be summarized (or sloganized) as “national sovereignty and non-interference.” Good fences 
make good neighbors. 
According to de Coning, the BRICS “articulate an alternative vision for a new global order that is 
more democratic, just, fair, rule-based”, using “concepts like democracy, fairness and rule-governed 
behaviour” to signal “that they perceive the current global order to be undemocratic, unjust, unfair 
and arbitrarily manipulated by a dominant superpower.” The BRICS “are committed to exploring 
new models and approaches to global governance which strive for more equitable development and 
inclusive global growth.” 
Though de Coning no doubt accurately recounts the official positions of the BRICS countries and 
their joint summit communiques, the fact that he does so without so much as a whiff of irony is 
somewhat disturbing. Can he really accept at face value the proposition that BRICS objections to 
Western military interventions in the Middle East stem from the fact that these interventions “deny 
the people in these countries the opportunity to choose their own leaders”? 
Nowhere does de Coning, who holds “a PhD in Applied Ethics”, explicitly endorse the BRICS 
countries’ own records on democracy, fairness, and justice, but neither does he condemn them. And 
while the editors of The BRICS and Coexistence are scrupulously non-judgmental, most of the 
contributors to the book do judge the BRICS, and find little to condemn other than the unfortunate 
fact that the rest of the world has not fallen into line with the new BRICS ethics. 
BRICS behaving badly 
In fact, the BRICS may offer less a new world order than a revival of the worst of the old. They are a 
generation behind best practice in global governance standards and seem to be in no hurry to catch 
up. Instead, they seem determined to use their relative size (and in the case of South Africa, moral 
capital) to resist pressure to behave better. In relations with many of their poorer neighbors, the 
BRICS seem to operate under the principle of “now it’s our turn to misbehave.” 
The BRICS countries’ external (and internal) records of development practice often recall the worst 
of the post-colonial West: corrupt contracts, collusion with dictators, land grabs, and the 
employment of host nation armies as private security guards. So argues Patrick Bond, lead editor of 
BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique, a collection of twenty-five essays that are mostly critical of the 
BRICS. 
In his own essay, Bond depicts the BRICS as “sub-imperialist” powers that mainly work within the 
existing international system, tending “to reinforce, not challenge, prevailing power relations.” They 
do not, as de Coning suggests, seek to offer an alternative, and they certainly do not offer a better or 
fairer alternative. Instead, they “promote neoliberal institutions even when complaining (sometimes 
bitterly) about their indifference to poorer countries.” 
According to Bond, the BRICS behave particularly badly in Africa. He explicitly compares the 2013 
BRICS Durban summit to the infamous 1884-1885 Berlin West Africa Conference, which ended with 
the allocation of nearly all of Africa to various European occupiers. Bond says that the BRICS are 
attempting “the continent’s economic carve-up, unburdened—now as then—by what would be 
derided as ‘Western’ concerns about democracy and human rights.” (emphasis in original) 
Bond calls for “solidarity from below”—cooperation by civil society both inside and outside the 
BRICS countries— to force improvements in the BRICS governments’ behavior both at home and 
abroad. Surely the problem here is that all of the BRICS countries have relatively weak civil societies, 
and their poorer neighbors weaker still. He recognizes this challenge, and the long odds against 
successful opposition. Still, in his view this is a fight must be fought, and not just in academic 
monographs. 
Many of the other contributors to An Anti-Capitalist Critique echo Bond’s skepticism, both for the 
BRICS and for the chances of improving their behavior. They tell scandalous stories of BRICS 
neocolonialism in southern Africa, expose Chinese corruption in the Andean region of South 
America, and recount the global misdeeds of Brazilian mining giant Vale. Additional chapters focus 
on scandals involving the Rio Olympics and contemporary Russia. 
Less interesting are the short chapters by big-name leftist intellectuals that open and close the book. 
Skip these well-rehearsed position pieces and read this book instead for the less-polished but much 
more interesting empirical chapters in the middle. These are written by engaged scholar-activists 
who have stories to tell and axes to grind. Having experienced the BRICS and their exploitation first-
hand, their authors tell us not just what the BRICS are thinking, but what they are doing. 
Not much 
To hear Ray Kiely tell it, what the BRICS are doing is “not much”. In The BRICs, US ‘Decline’ and 
Global Transformations, he explodes the myth that the BRICS have changed everything. In fact 
they’ve changed very little. Kiely, like Bond, see the BRICS as mainly status quo powers that are 
doing everything they can to benefit as much as possible within the existing international system. 
None of the BRICS—least of all China— is seeking radical political change. 
Kiely structures his book around five overlapping approaches to understanding the BRICS: that they 
offer a new “state capitalist” model for the international political economy, that they are challenging 
the power structures of today’s US-led international system, that they have given rise to a “Beijing 
Consensus” through which China will soon rule the world, that they demonstrate a kind of final 
victory for export-led market capitalism, and Kiely’s own view that the success of the BRICS really 
hasn’t changed much after all. 
Kiely does not argue for this final view; he shows it. He shows that the BRICS are very much “state 
capitalist”, but that nearly everyone else is too. He shows that the greatest period of BRICS 
success— the decade of the 2000s—was a period in which the BRICS (especially China) 
enthusiastically embraced (and benefitted from) the existing power structures of the US-led 
international system. The BRICS boom was at heart a China boom, and the China boom depended on 
access to the US market. 
He then examines the history of BRICS country voting on the UN Security Council and other 
intergovernmental organizations, showing that while they have occasionally disagreed with the 
United States their positions have been well within the range of those taken by close American 
allies. They have not coalesced around a “Beijing Consensus” in opposition to American power. Even 
China hasn’t. 
Overall, Kiely believes that “the rise of the South is exaggerated, as is the decline of the West and 
the US in particular.” While acknowledging America’s large foreign indebtedness, he points out that 
US “dependence on foreign capital has different consequences from other countries’ dependence on 
US capital.” After all, it was not long ago that Alan Greenspan was warning about the potentially 
catastrophic impact on the global financial system were the US to pay off all its debts. 
Kiely is not a doom-monger foreseeing the imminent collapse of the BRICS. He is a sensible analyst 
attempting to balance the doom-mongers who foresee the imminent collapse of the West. He lands 
in the middle, concluding that “we are seeing the erosion of a global North-South divide” 
complemented by “the (gradual) decline of the West, including the leading role of the US in the 
international order.” This sounds sensible, even sage. 
But on closer inspection it seems that Kiely may simply be hedging his bets. In fact, he presents 
ample evidence of stable and even increasing American dominance in the world. This includes 
extraordinarily high US profitability on foreign investments, US technological leadership, the 
increasing dominance of US multinational corporations, and what Kiely calls “asymmetrical 
interdependence” in the global economy that strongly favors the United States. 
What in all this suggests even the slow relative decline of the United States? Kiely’s scenarios for US 
decline all depend on projections into the future, projections that may or may not turn out true. 
Such projections were at the root of BRICS doom-mongering in the first place. 
In a short follow-up book, The Rise and Fall of Emerging Powers: Globalisation, US Power and the 
Global North-South Divide, Kiely hedges less. Writing less than a year and a half after the wishy-
washy conclusion to The BRICs, US ‘Decline’ and Global Transformations, he argues two points in this 
new book: that the US remains firmly in control of the international system and that far from 
representing a viable challenge, the emerging market countries (including especially the BRICS) are 
facing a crisis of their own. 
Though Kiely is correct to note the recent BRICS slowdown, there are no signs that the slowdown is 
turning into a rout. Brazil, Russia, and South Africa have all experienced recessions but nothing 
approaching a collapse—not even Russia, despite being hit with Western economic sanctions in the 
wake of the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Kiely seems to have missed one important lesson of the 2008-2009 
Global Financial Crisis: the fact that the BRICS economies are actually quite insulated from global 
economic trends. 
One chapter of The Rise and Fall of Emerging Powers is dedicated to debunking this notion that the 
BRICS and other emerging market economies have somehow “decoupled” from the larger global 
economy. But the BRICS were never very well-integrated into the global economy in the first place. 
Brazil and South Africa are mainly commodities exporters, and India and Russia are hardly integrated 
at all. Only China has come to be closely integrated into global production networks, but although 
China now plays a huge role in these networks, these networks do not play a huge role in China. 
China’s economy as a whole is still overwhelmingly a domestic economy driven by domestic 
investment and (to a lesser extent) consumption. The contributions of net foreign direct investment 
and net exports to China’s economy are not insignificant but total less than 5 percent of GDP. 
Kiely suggests that China and the BRICS are slowing because the global economy is slowing. One 
might just as well turn this around: the global economy is slowing because China and the BRICS are 
slowing. China is, after all, the world’s second-largest economy, and its slowdown has much more to 
do with low domestic consumption than with disappointing export markets. 
The other four BRICS also lack vibrant domestic economies. The common denominator of the BRICS 
and other emerging market economies is that they are forever “emerging” and never “emerged”. 
They are caught in a middle income trap that leaves them only partially and superficially integrated 
with the much more dynamic economies of North America, western Europe, and the East Asian 
littoral fringe. 
Here to stay 
The BRICS and their acronym successors (MINTs and others sure to come) may not create a new 
world order, but neither will they fade into irrelevance. They are and will remain large but secondary 
zones of the global economy characterized by high levels of state intervention and high levels of 
corruption, which are after all flipsides of the same coin. They will meddle in the economic 
management of their smaller and weaker neighbors but no more than they muddle the 
management of their own economies. They may be locally harmful (especially to their own people) 
but they are systemically harmless. 
If there is a common thread to books about the BRICS, it is that they give the BRICS too much credit, 
both for good and for bad. Perhaps that is not surprising. A mediocre protagonist makes for a boring 
story. But mediocrity is the prevailing spirit of the BRICS, even China, which has accepted the “new 
normal” of slow growth as it seeks to become merely a “moderately prosperous society.” That’s not 
a bad ambition. But it is hardly an ambitious ambition. You don’t change the world by aiming for 
moderation. 
